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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS ON THE MACROECONOMIC EFFECT OF NATURAL RESOURCE RENTS 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, May 2014 
Under the Supervision of Professor Hamid Mohtadi  
 
This dissertation comprise of two chapters on the macroeconomic effect of natural 
resource rents. Specifically, we focus on the effect of resource rents on human capital 
accumulation. In chapter one, we present a new mechanism for the curse of natural 
resources, i.e., “why natural resource rents if distributed as transfers to individuals’ 
income might retard economic growth and development: their effect on incentives to 
invest in human capital”. Extending an OLG model for this purpose, we show that the 
windfall rents from natural resources, when transferred directly to citizens distort their 
incentives away from accumulating the optimum level of human capital and thus from 
economic growth. This increases the chance of a low-level equilibrium trap and reduces 
the chance of converging to a higher income per capita in the long run.  
 
In chapter two, we present a dynamic panel data model, and a cross section model to see 
the effect of transfers in countries with high natural resource rents per person on human 
capital accumulation. We use tertiary education as a human capital indicator, since at this 
educational level, people choose to accumulate professional skills and direct their talents 
to sectors with the highest expected return. Using a dynamic panel data model for five 
years averages of tertiary education, one can see that the combined effect of government 
 iii 
 
transfers and natural resource rents per labor have a negative and significant effect on 
human capital. However, using a cross section analysis for the same purpose, one can see 
that not only the combined effect of resource rents per labor and government transfers 
have a negative and significant effect on tertiary education, but also resource rents per 
labor alone have a negative and significant effect on tertiary education. Our cross section 
results coincide with the natural resource curse literature as it shows that resource rents 
have a long-term negative effect on social capital investments such as tertiary education. 
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INCOME TRANSFERS AND HUMAN CAPITAL: 
APPLICATION TO RESOURCE RICH COUNTRIES 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
We present a new mechanism for the curse of natural resources, i.e., “why direct transfers 
stemming from natural resource rents retard economic growth and development in 
resource rich countries: their effect on incentives to invest in human capital”. Extending 
an OLG model for this purpose, we show that the windfall rents from natural resources, 
when transferred to citizens’ income, distort their incentives away from the accumulation 
of human capital and thus economic growth. This increases the chance of a low-level 
equilibrium trap and reduces the chance of converging to a higher income per capita in 
the long run.  
Intuition suggests that rents from natural resources should accelerate economic growth by 
expanding the production possibilities frontier and enhancing the accumulation of factors 
that contribute to growth.1 However, evidence suggests a more complex picture. For 
example, the Middle Eastern and North African regions with their wealth in oil and other 
natural resources, experienced low or negative long-term growth.2 Yet other countries as 
                                                
1 For example, Thorvaldur Gylfason (2007) cited several factors: increased savings, accelerating the accumulation of 
physical and human capital; foreign trade and the accumulation of foreign reserves; manufacturing and industrialization 
to enhance diversification in production and increased economic growth. 
 
2 Esfahani (2008) showed that economic growth for the oil producing MENA countries between 1970 to 2006 was only 
0.7 percent. Further, Looking at growth for the period between 1986 and 1995, one can see that growth was -0.8 
percent (Esfahani 2008). 
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diverse as Botswana, Chile, and Norway who possess vast natural resources have 
experienced acceptable rates of economic growth. Explanations for these contradictory 
phenomena are also varied. Some natural resource curse explanations focus on the 
interaction of institutions and natural resources.3 Others focus on the so-called Dutch 
disease, in which resource booms induce an appreciation of the real exchange rate that 
leads to a lower production of tradables, retarding diversification and growth.4 Higher 
resource rent volatility is another key factor affecting lower long run growth especially in 
countries that are highly dependent on resource profits and their government spending is 
pro-cyclical (Gylfason 2001)5.   
However, because it is well known that economic growth is also highly influenced by 
human capital investments, the question arises of whether natural resources might have 
an inherently adverse effect on human capital accumulation. Evidence suggests this may 
indeed be the case. For example, in a cross-country study Behbudi et al. (2010) showed 
that there is an inverse relationship between secondary education and resource abundance 
in oil producing nations. If we recast their results for tertiary education (a form of 
education more closely tied to R&D and, thus, to economic growth-via new growth 
theory), we find that for a sample of countries that include most of the developed and 
developing resource rich nations, natural resource rents (as a percentage of GDP) and 
                                                
3Yet, the fact that a majority of natural resource-rich economies suffer from poor governance or that indicators of both democracy and 
corruption in these countries are found to belong to the lowest range. In this explanation, countries with poor institutions become 
subject to the "curse" (e.g., the Middle Eastern economies) while those with good institutions have a greater chance of escaping the 
curse (e.g., Norway and Botswana)  (Mehlum et al. 2006).  
4 See Corden and Neary (1972) for the original Dutch disease hypothesis in the Netherlands.  
5 Higher growth volatility in natural resource countries reduces the certainty of investment in physical capital, and lower growth. 
Philippot (2010) argued that fluctuations in international resource prices create a high level of uncertainty in private and public 
investments.  
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tertiary education (as a percentage of population of official tertiary education age) are 
negatively correlated (Figure 1). 
FIGURE 1: NATURAL RESOURCES PERCENTAGE OF GDP AND TERTIARY EDUCATION 
 
Source: By the authors  
 
In this paper, we seek to explain the adverse outcome of distributed rents by focusing on 
the effect of natural resource on the incentive to accumulate human capital. We argue that 
natural resource rents result in an adverse incentive problem that retards the optimal 
desire to invest in one's human capital if rents are distributed to individuals’ income. This 
happens as resource rents enter the individual’s budget constraint via a lump-sum 
transfer. To examine this issue, we extend an overlapping generations model by Iyigun 
and Own (1997) and incorporate natural resource rents into it. The model will show how 
natural rents, when distributed as lump-sum transfers, reduce the optimum expected 
returns to human capital in the long run. It is true that transfers may occur with and 
without natural resources. However, transfers from sources other than the windfall rents 
would have to be financed by tax revenues. As such, their "incentive reducing" effect (as 
we shall see), will be countered by the income taxes that need to be generated to finance 
them. It is in this sense that the transfers of the type we model in this paper are closely 
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4 
income transfer stemming from resource rents, and significantly lower tax rates compared 
to non-resource countries6. 
The basic idea is simple, yet intuitive. Transfers from natural resource rents are 
distributed to the society at large. These transfers append citizens expected income, both 
in human capital and the unskilled labor sector. Evidence suggests that resource rich 
countries do provide this form of income premium transfers, possibly to placate society 
or reduce the risk of social and political unrest. For example, the Kuwaiti authorities 
spent 4.12 billion dinars in 2008 on lump-sum cash transfers to national citizens, which 
were up to 43% of government aggregate expenditures (El-Katiri et al. 2011). Further 
evidence of such transfers can be found in the case of Saudi Arabia and United Arab 
Emirates as well (IMF 2012). For example, in Saudi Arabia, these transfers show up in 
the form of wage premia that stem from oil rents. To indicate the extent of such transfers, 
one can compare the wages of Saudi nationals with those of foreign workers. According 
to the IMF, on average, non-skilled labor income of Saudi nationals is 4.1 times of that 
the expatriates. Gelb and Decker (2011) argued that the levels of transfers received by 
citizens of the UAE through guaranteed employment and other mechanisms probably 
discourage work effort and education aspirations for many individuals. It is obvious that 
citizens of such nations enjoy this wage premia generated either directly from resource 
rents or after investing resource rents in SWFs (sovereign wealth funds). To link 
government transfers with resource rents, Gelb and Decker (2011) argued that average 
fiscal revenues from natural resources in 14 Middle Eastern natural resources exporter 
countries were around 57.2% of total revenues. This gives anecdotal evidence that 
                                                
6 According to the 2012 CIA fact-book, the majority of resource rich developing countries have tax rates 
below ten percent, and some of them go down to zero percent.       
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transfers distributed in such countries stem mainly from resource rents. Further, authors 
including Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) advocated direct resource rents 
distribution for countries such as Nigeria and Iraq.  
We study how human capital’s expected returns depend on resource rents using two types 
of human capital (entrepreneurship and professional). Our findings indicate that more 
distributed rents to the society at large reduces the aggregate level of both types of human 
capital leading to more unskilled labor force in the long run. Additionally, the fraction of 
resource rents transferred mainly to human capital generates a misallocation of talent 
between entrepreneurial and professional capital yet changing the income growth 
dynamics along the growth path. This causes the income to enter a low-level equilibrium 
trap in a multi-equilibria setting. We do find, however, that if the initial level of 
technology is sufficiently advanced, countries can still converge to a high level steady 
state of expected income, regardless of the level of resource rents distributed.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 conducts an extensive 
review of the literature on natural resources and economic growth, stressing the literature 
that is most relevant to our study. Section 3 presents the theoretical model, which 
specifies the behavior of households when resource rent are distribution by the 
government as direct transfers, and it also explains the findings of our model with some 
concluding remarks.  
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2. LITERATURE SURVEY 
2.1.  A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
The economic history of the last two centuries demonstrates conflicting evidence 
concerning the connection between resource abundance and economic growth (Behbudi, 
Mamipour, and Karami 2010). The development experience in many of today’s industrial 
economics, during the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century saw natural 
resources as an engine of growth (Stevens, 2003).7 Yet, even for these countries and even 
in 19th century that assumption was not universally borne out. For example, many 
resource-poor economies outperformed Spain despite its immense reserves of gold and 
silver brought from the colonies. Continuing into the 20th century, resource-poor nations 
such as Japan and Switzerland surged ahead of resource-rich countries such as Russia. 
The same anomaly is observed in the developing world in the second half of the 20th 
century. The world’s star performers over the past three decades have been the resource-
poor economies of East Asia while many resource-abundant countries including oil 
producers such as Nigeria, Venezuela, Mexico, and the MENA countries have not 
performed nearly as well.8 
2.2. NATURAL RESOURCES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
                                                
7Stevens (2003) presented a review of the historical growth experience of the US, the Scandinavian 
countries, Australia, and Canada. Pointing to the positive role, his analysis logically implies that natural 
resources should actually boost economic development in the above countries. His main argument is that as 
natural capital increases the production possibilities frontiers of the endowed economy should increase. 
Stevens also argued that at the very least, wealth from natural resources should not deter or impede 
economic performance.  
8Bravo-Ortega and Gregorio (2007) go further by arguing that natural resources may even be blamed for 
the slow-down in the development of countries such as Latin America., and now the MENA regions. 
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A large body of literature points to the adverse impact of resources on economic growth 
in developing countries over the past four decades (Behbudi, Mamipour and Karami 
2010), a relationship now termed "the resource curse". We highlight these findings here 
in Figure 2.  
 
FIGURE 2: NATURAL RESOURCES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
Source: the authors 
 
This negative association poses a puzzle, as it runs counter to economic logic and 
intuition. For example, resource rich nations have sought to utilize the vast rents from oil 
to finance investments in industrial and financial sectors. An example from the 19th 
century, can be found for the U.S., Germany, and Britain, which were highly endowed in 
natural resources, experienced a rapid industrial development during that period. The 
availability of coal deposits in such countries was the sine qua non for the development 
of the local steel industry (Gylfason, and Zoega 1999). Surprisingly, however, Japan and 
Korea in the past century succeeded in becoming world-class steel manufacturers despite 
of their virtual dependence on imported iron ore. While natural resources are no longer a 
key to economic development in the above-mentioned developed countries, it is 
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8 
surprising that for other developing nations these resources might actually hinder 
development.     
2.3. MECHANISMS LINKING NATURAL RESOURCES AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 
Theories that address the association between natural resource abundance and economic 
growth have been traditionally based on various forms of crowding effects. Our work 
offers a fresh perspective that differs from this general approach. However, before we 
present our perspective and model, a select overview of existing literature seems 
warranted. In general, four mechanisms can be identified for the transmission of the 
detrimental effects of natural resource abundance on economic growth. We present each 
briefly.  
2.3.1. NATURAL CAPITAL AND THE DUTCH DISEASE  
The Dutch disease hypothesis argues that natural resource abundance influences prices 
through the overvaluation of the country’s currency associated with high inflation, which 
reduces exports of non-resource tradable goods and increases production of non-tradable 
goods (Frankel 2010). Sachs and Warner (2001) claimed that if the traded sector is the 
engine of growth, then a resource shock retards growth by reallocating factors such as 
labor and land from the traded (manufacturing) to the non-traded sector. Moreover, 
higher inflation stemming from higher government spending via taxes or royalties 
contributes to a higher return in the non-traded sector. These crowded-out non-resource 
exports are mainly in the manufacturing sector, which results in deindustrialization in the 
long run. Supporting evidence of this crowding out phenomenon can be observed among 
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the Middle Eastern oil exporter countries for whom total non-oil exports as a share of 
GDP declined over the last five decades while non-oil producing nations saw a 
significant increase in their total exports (Gylfason, 2004).  
Frankel also argued that the Dutch disease might arise from sources other than the 
commodity price boom. A discovery of new reserves or an expansion in resource supplies 
leads resource exports to increase dramatically along with a heightened capital inflow to 
develop new reserves. Any of these factors will contribute to a shifting of labor and other 
resources to the non-tradable sector. 
2.3.2. NATURAL RESOURCE, SAVINGS/INVESTMENTS AND PHYSICAL CAPITAL  
Natural resource endowment has the potential to reduce public investments and private 
incentives to invest domestically, hence impeding economic growth (Gylfason and Zoega 
2001, IMF 2012). A key-contributing factor in this effect is thought to be the volatility of 
natural rents, which leads to great uncertainty in reducing investments in different types 
of capital (both physical and human), (Gylfason 2001).  
This volatility of natural resource rents specifically hinders public investments especially 
in countries that run pro-cyclical fiscal policies. Consistent with this, Behbudi, Mamipour 
and Karami (2010) have shown that resource abundant countries have a low level of 
domestic (public and private) investments and thus have a lower social return on 
investments, yet growing slower than resource-poor economies. 
Expectations and perceptions may also matter. The IMF 2012, in its annual report on 
resource rich economies, argued that natural resources may create a false sense of 
security when there is a rapid rise in output that natural resources create. This in turn 
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reduces demand for domestic investments, and prudent governments save resource rents 
abroad in the form of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). This results in lower rates of 
domestic consumption and investments in the short and the medium run. Gylfason (2001) 
also argued that an increase of 10 percent in natural capital share decreases investment by 
approximately 2 percent per GDP. 
 
2.3.3. NATURAL RESOURCES, HUMAN CAPITAL AND GROWTH  
Numerous studies have confirmed the positive contribution of education to economic 
growth.9 Given our focus on tertiary education, it is worthwhile to examine this effect for 
tertiary education. Figure 3 confirms this positive influence between tertiary education 
and GDP per-capita growth for 46 nations. 
FIGURE 3: TERTIARY EDUCATION AND REAL GDP PER-CAPITA GROWTH BETWEEN 1980 AND 2009 
Source: the authors 
 
Coupled with the findings from Figure 1, one can deduce the adverse role of natural 
resources on economic growth via the channel of human capital. The literature seems to 
support this view. For example, Gylfason (2001), Bravo and Gregorio (2000) and Stijns 
                                                
9A recent study by the World Bank revealed that human capital has the greatest influence on income as 
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(2001) have investigated the effect of natural resource endowment on human capital 
accumulation. In his empirical analysis, Gylfason concluded that natural capital seems to 
crowd out human capital hence suppressing growth. 10.  
The mechanism by which natural resources may suppress human capital accumulation, if 
they do, is unclear. Some evidence implicates government spending: government 
expenditures on education as a fraction of GDP and school enrollments have both been 
found to be negatively related to the level of natural resources (Gylfason, Herbertsson, 
and Zoega 1999). Similarly, Birdsall, Pinckney and Sabot (2001) showed that resource-
rich countries invest less in training than resource-poor countries11. A similarly poor 
performance was reported for Northern Africa, and Latin America. However, the 
disparity in human capital accumulation in Africa between resource-rich and resource-
poor countries was found to be ambiguous due to the existence of civil wars and fragility 
in such countries. Highly skilled workers in most African resource rich countries are 
generally educated in foreign countries and often belong to the political elites (Birdsall, 
Pinckney and Sabot 2001). In such countries, resource rents may be concentrated within a 
small portion of the society. Others have focused on natural resources, human capital and 
the growth nexus via a lack diversification (Brunnshweiler, 2006).  In this vein, Leamer 
(1999) argued that the under-accumulation of human capital makes it difficult for 
resource abundant nations to pursue industrial diversification, and the development of 
sectors other than the resource sector. 
                                                
10Gylfason showed that nations that rely heavily on their natural capital as their most vital source of 
production may unintentionally overlook the development of their human resources, and  allocate an 
inadequate attention on their expenditure on skill accumulation and research.  
11Resource poor countries in Asia showed an average of 60 percent school enrollment in the 1980s, but 
there was  only 38 percent average enrollment in resource abundant countries. 
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The issue of comparative advantage also plays a role in the adverse effect of resources on 
human capital.  For example, Behbudi, Mamipour and Karami (2010) have argued that 
countries, endowed with large natural reserves, find it easier to engage chiefly in the 
production or extraction of such resources because their comparative abundance of these 
resources requires low levels of initial investments. Further, resource-based industries do 
not require an intensive level of human capital compared with sectors such as 
manufacturing. Thus the exploitation of such resources comes at the expense of social 
services, specifically human capital development. Relatedly, Gylfason (2001) argues that 
focusing on natural resources as the main source of national income, retards the 
development of the manufacturing sector because skilled jobs are scarce and hence 
returns to human capital are low. Birdsall, Pinckney, and Sabot (2001) argue that citizens 
do not therefore find it necessary to pressure governments into providing skill intensive 
sectors. 
 
2.3.5 OTHER MECHANISMS THAT LINK NATURAL RESOURCES TO HUMAN CAPITAL 
There are other channels through which the presence of natural resources affects human 
capital accumulation. Birdsall, Pinckney and Sabot (2001) linked the lack of human 
capital accumulation to the behavior of political and economic elites, where human 
capital accumulation might affect their regimes through increasing the level of think 
tanks. Another explanation of the curse is that natural resources encourage corruption. 
When corruption is high, it is possible for civil servants, ministers and bureaucrats to 
divert money intended for building schools and human capital investments (Sala-I-Martin 
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and Subramanian 2003). Natural resources also tend to decrease political stability and 
encourage civil conflicts.12 
3. THEORETICAL MODEL  
The previous transmission mechanisms of the effect of natural resource transfers on 
human capital and growth have not considered the key role of incentives, although the 
point by Gylfason (2001) of low returns to human capital comes close. In this section we 
extend an overlapping generations model that captures the incentive channel and shows 
how natural resource rents influence human capital if rents are distributed as income 
transfers. This behavior diminishes the possibility of countries with a low initial level of 
technology to converge to high-income groups. The model adopts an overlapping 
generations framework with a structure similar to Owen and Iyigun (1997). We add to 
their model the role of resource rents and its influence on the individual’s choice to 
accumulate more skills. Further, we distinguish between resource transferred to the 
society at large, and the fraction targeted to human capital. The inclusion of the resource 
rents distribution mechanism into an overlapping generations model is an important 
innovation that allows us to study the effect of the resource curse in a dynamic setting. It 
shows the consequences of natural resource rents for the incentive of citizens to 
accumulate human capital and therefore increase economic growth at large.   
In this model, there are three periods. In the first period, citizens choose either to invest in 
human capital or to supply unskilled labor in the labor market. In the second period, if an 
                                                
12Philippot (2010) provides an example of the civil war in Ivory Coast, where the central government could 
not effectively implement its education policy in the northern side of the country due to poor rule of laws, 
and the high influence of militias. 
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individual invests in human capital, she will receive an expected income plus a resource 
based transfer known ex ante. Otherwise she works as an unskilled worker, earning a 
fixed income   "𝜔"   and a resource-based lump-sum transfer (predetermined by the 
government in the first period) in the first and the second period. In the third period both 
skilled and unskilled workers consume generated income.  
Human capital is of two types: professional and entrepreneurial. In period 2, professional 
human capital income is certain and dependent on the level of technology accumulated 
and the lump-sum resource transfers, whereas the entrepreneur’s income is uncertain with 
some probability of success. The role of entrepreneurial human capital in this paper is 
essential for several reasons. First, economic theory suggests that technological 
advancements and growth rely on both professional and entrepreneurial capital. Second, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that in oil rich economies resource booms do not necessarily 
lead to the accumulation of professional human capital. Instead, resource booms lead to a 
large increase in self-employed activities in non-manufacturing (usually non-tradables) 
sectors such as commercial and residential projects, wholesale and retail merchandise 
trade, and restaurants and hotels. For example, in 2001, Saudi Arabia’s manufacturing 
sector was only 9.8 percent of its GDP, while self-employed activities such as restaurants 
and hotels, transportation, and construction projects accumulated to almost 30 percent of 
total GDP activities (Saudi’s Ministry of Economics 2012).  
Third, the mechanism by which resource booms lead to increased self-employed 
activities involves disincentives compared with other alternatives such as accumulation of 
professional human capital via tertiary education. This dynamic has its roots in 
governments’ massive direct and indirect transfer programs especially in oil rich (or more 
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generally resource rich) economies, regardless of the uncertainty of self-employment 
return. Given this background, we convey this stylized fact by adding a stochastic 
entrepreneurial return to our utility maximization problem, associated with a rent-based 
lump-sum transfer given by the government for both professional and entrepreneurial 
capital. We look at the effect of resource wealth on an individual’s choice while selecting 
her profession, and how this will influence the macroeconomic growth process in 
resource-rich countries.   
A key simplifying assumption of this paper, which allows for a sharper focus on the role 
of natural resources in incentives to invest in human capital, is to abstract from other 
channels such as the Dutch disease, volatility, and political economy. To this end, the 
paper does not model the production of the resource itself but instead focuses on its 
distribution to society. This is captured by considering the role of natural resources in 
generating windfall profits but not otherwise contributing to the production process. 
While a simplification, this consideration allows us to focus on an important and 
overlooked channel, namely the incentive channel.   
3.1. ASSUMPTIONS 
We consider a perfectly competitive economy made up of homogenous goods. At any 
time (t), production (𝑌!) is a highly simplified function of human capital (𝐻! ) and 
unskilled labor (𝐿!)  
 Y! = A!H! +ωL! (1) 
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Each factor input earns its marginal productivity, which in the case of human capital is 
associated with the level of technology (𝐴!). (Later, we will see that 𝐴! will itself depend 
on mean education and entrepreneurship of the previous period) 
 
!!!!!! = 𝐴!                                                                                    (2) !!!!!! = 𝜔,                                               (3)      
SOCIETY  
Each individual faces three periods and the size of the society is normalized to one. We 
will assume a zero population growth and every individual is endowed with a certain 
level of innate ability 𝑎!. Innate ability 𝑎! is uniformly distributed13 between 0 and 1. 
Where 𝑎! = 0 represent the lowest percentile and 𝑎! = 1 is the highest percentile of 
innate ability. 𝑔 𝑎! 𝑑 𝑎 = 1!! ,                (4) 
Individuals choose to invest in human capital or work as an unskilled laborer depending 
on their level of innate ability. A relatively high level of innate ability, above a certain 
threshold, will increase the chance of an individual to invest in human capital.  
At each period an individual is endowed with one unit of time (t). If she chooses to invest 
in human capital, she will spend (𝑠!) on schooling and (1− 𝑠!) on entrepreneurship, 
where  (1− 𝑠!) is considered an entrepreneur’s set up cost. Choosing to invest in human 
capital requires agents to allocate their time optimally between schooling (𝑠!)  and 
entrepreneurship 1− 𝑠! , for any given level of resource transfer distributed by the 
                                                
13 The use of the uniform distribution will show up in Section 3.4.   
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government. Individuals can invest in either a specific type of human capital or both. The 
level an individual accumulates of professional human capital (𝑝!!!! ), is an increasing 
function of (𝑠!). Similarly, accumulation of entrepreneurial capital (𝑒!!!! ) is an increasing 
function of (1− 𝑠!). 𝑒!!!!   = 𝑎!𝑓(1− 𝑠!) 0 < 𝑠! < 1              (5) 𝑝!!!!   = 𝑎!𝑓(𝑠!) ,              𝑓! . > 0  , 𝑓!! . < 0                   (6) 
3.2. THE ROLE OF NATURAL RESOURCES  
Earlier, we highlighted the role of transfers in the case of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and 
United Arab Emirates. In our model, we assume that resource rents are distributed to the 
society at large. Incorporating natural resource rents in the form of transfers will have a 
significant effect on the model’s outcome. In this model we assume that country (𝑘) 
accumulates resource rents (Ω) every period. Individuals in society (𝑘)  enjoy a fraction 
Ω!"# = 1−γ 𝛺  of the resource rents (Ω) , where (𝛾𝛺)  is the fraction that the 
government keeps.14 Leaving 𝛾𝛺 to the government to extract the political influence on 
resource rents out of our model, yet leave us with the net level of resource transfers 
distributed to the masses Ω!"#.  
The fraction of total resource rent  Ω!"#  is distributed as a lump-sum transfer to all agents. 
We assume agent (i) has a perfect insight concerning the size and the timing of future 
transfers by the government. If an individual chooses to invest in human capital in period 
(t), she will receive a predetermined transfer 𝛼𝛺!"#in period (t+1). However, if she 
chooses not to accumulate skills, she will receive  (1− 𝛼)𝛺!"# in (t) and (t+1) such that 
                                                
14 This fraction goes to the government to spend on public goods. However, in our model we do not model 
the role of public goods.  
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distributed to human capital (𝛼)  will have a significant influence on the human capital 
accumulation process. The last assumption of the model is that the national level of 
technology depends on the economy wide average of both professional and 
entrepreneurial capital: 𝐴!!! = 𝐴  (𝑒! ,𝑝!)  with the following properties15,               (7)                                                                                                                                   𝐴! > 0,𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝐴!! < 0              (7.1)         𝐴! > 0,𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝐴!! < 0 𝐴!" > 0,𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝐴!" > 0 
Given the level of technology, an individual’s total income including the resource 
transfer will be as follows, for income from human capital forms we have the following:   
Human capital income 𝑦!!!!  with superscript (p) represent professional human capital,   𝑦!!!! ! = 𝑤!!!! 𝑃!!!! + 𝛼𝛺!"# = 𝐴!!!𝑃!!!! + 𝛼𝛺!"#               (8) 
while human capital income 𝑦!!!!  with superscript (e) represents entrepreneurial human 
capital,   
 Y!!!! !"#$!!!       =   𝑤!!!! 𝑒!!!! + 𝛼𝛺!"# = 𝐴!!!𝑒!!!! + 𝛼𝛺!"# ,𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦  𝑞        (8.1) Y!!!! !"#$%&'! = 𝛼𝛺!"# ,𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦  (1− 𝑞) 
 
                                                
15 Absence of on the right hand side of (7) suggests that it is the stock of technology being determined 
by the previous level of professional and entrepreneurial human capital, rather than technological change. 
This aspect of our paper which follows Iyigun and Owen (1997)’s similar assumption would not affect the 
modeling of the dynamics.    
tA
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where the subscripts (sucess) and (Failure) represent a successful entrepreneur with 
probability (q) and a failed entrepreneur with probability (1-q), respectively, given that 
return on entrepreneurship is uncertain. Labor income 𝑌! in period (t) and (𝑡 + 1) is fixed 
in every period and given by,  𝑌! =   𝜔 + 1− 𝛼 𝛺!"# ,                        (8.2) 
3.3. HOUSEHOLDS  
We assume a simple natural log form for the utility function, U(c) =  𝑙𝑛  (𝑐). An unskilled 
laborer earns income in periods (𝑡)  and (𝑡 + 1), and consumes all generated income in 
period (𝑡 + 2). Given that the unskilled laborer income is constant in both periods, and 
then her utility maximization problem will be as follows,  
!"#!! 𝑈 𝑐!!!  ! = 𝑙𝑛  (𝑐!!)+ 𝑙𝑛(𝑐!!!! )                                                (9) 
Subject to 𝑌! = ω+ 1−α Ω!"#  
However skilled workers maximize the following:  
!"#!!    𝐸[𝑈 𝑐!!!  ! |𝑡] = [𝑞𝑙𝑛 𝑐!!!! !"#$%% + 1− 𝑞 𝑙𝑛 𝑐!!!! !"#$%&']                   (9.1)                       
Subject to:    Y!!!! =    Y!!!! ! +   Y!!!! !,  
Where 𝑐!!!! !"#$%%  represents consumption if the entrepreneur is successful. Similarly, 𝑐!!!! !"#$%&' is consumption if the entrepreneur is a failure. Substituting the budget 
constraint into the maximization problem (9.1), then the expected utility will take the 
following form,  𝐸[𝑈 𝑐!!!  ! |𝑡] = 𝑞𝑙𝑛 Y!!!! ! + Y!!!! ! !"#$%% + 1− 𝑞 𝑙𝑛 Y!!!! ! !"#$%&'     (9.2)   
Substituting (8) and (8.1) in equation (9.2),  
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!"#!!   {𝐸𝑈 𝑐!!!  ! 𝑡 = 𝑞𝑙𝑛[𝐴!!!(𝑝!!!! + 𝑒!!!! )+ 𝛼𝛺!"#]   + 1− 𝑞 𝑙𝑛  [𝐴!!!𝑝!!!!       +𝛼𝛺!"#] }                               (10) 
The first order condition (F.O.C. = 0) for this maximization problem (10) with respect to 
(𝑠!) yields to individual’s optimal choice of schooling (𝑠𝑖∗):  −𝑞 𝐴!!!𝑎!𝑓 𝑠!∗ + 𝛼𝛺!"# [𝑓! 𝑠!∗ − 𝑓! 1 − 𝑠!∗ ]= (1 − 𝑞){A!!!a![f s!∗ + f 1 − s!∗ ] +αΩ!"#}𝑓! s!∗      
     (10.1)                           
 If we rearrange (10.1), we will get the following16,  
 
!!!!! !"#$%%!!!!! !"#$%&' =    !(!!!) !! !!!!∗ ![!! !!∗ ]!! !!∗                    (10.2) 
Suppose there is a threshold innate ability 𝑎! such that any individual that has 𝑎! > 𝑎!, 
will choose to invest in human capital. However, if 𝑎! < 𝑎!, she will choose to work as 
an unskilled laborer. Given any threshold ability 𝑎! , equation (11) must hold with 
equality as individuals’ returns equate, and people are indifferent between investing in 
human capital or work as an unskilled laborer.  
  𝑞𝑙𝑛{𝐴!!!𝑎![𝑓 si∗ + 𝑓 1− si∗ ]+ 𝛼𝛺!"#}+ 1− 𝑞 𝑙𝑛{𝐴!!!𝑎!𝑓(si∗)+ 𝛼𝛺!"#} =𝑙𝑛   2{𝜔  + 1− 𝛼 𝛺!"#}                               (11)                  
       
                                                
16 The second order condition is less than zero, S.O.C < 0 as shown in Appendix A.  
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A lower threshold value of the innate ability will increase the incentive of individuals to 
invest in human capital. From equation (11) we see that the threshold level of innate 
ability is influenced by the resource portion transferred to human capital  (𝛼), the size of 
resource rents distributed to the society 𝛺!"# ,  and the level of technology 𝐴!!!.  
Proposition 1:  
The threshold innate ability (𝑎!) decline as the share of resource rent distributed (𝛼), 
and professional and entrepreneurial human capital 𝑒!  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑝! increase. However,  (𝑎!)  
increases as resource rents distributed, 𝛺!"#  increases, therefore declining the incentive 
to invest in both types of  human capital.  
Proof: 
Using equation (11) and the implicit function theorem, it is simple to show that: 
!!!!!! < 0  , !!!!!! < 0, !!!!!! < 0, !!!!!!"#. > 0,                     (11.1)  
Given that the proportion of resource rents transferred to human capital (𝛼)  lowers the 
threshold ability, more citizens will have an incentive to invest in human capital due to 
the higher expected return generated in period 2. Interestingly, however, the windfall 
from resource rents transferred behaves in the reverse fashion: An increase in 𝛺!"# acts to 
increase the threshold innate ability at which skilled and unskilled incomes equalize, thus 
reducing citizen incentives to invest in human capital, and less people will be willing to 
invest in both professional and entrepreneurial capital. As a result of an increase in total 
transfers 𝛺!"# , the average level of human capital 𝐴 𝑒,𝑝  will decrease in future period. 
This is an important result that points to the distinction between fractions distributed to 
human capital (𝛼) and overall resource rents distributed 𝛺!"# on their effect on (𝑎!).  
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Revisiting and rearranging equation (10.2), while focusing on individuals with 𝑎! > 𝑎!, 
so as to focus on skilled workers only, the optimal level of schooling can be written as 
follows,  !!!!   = −    {!!!!!![! !!∗ !! !!!!∗ ]!αΩ!"#}!!!!!!! !!∗ !αΩ!"# ∗ !! !!∗[!! !!∗ !!! !!!!∗ ]                          (12)     
The above first order condition indicates that the optimum schooling level (𝑠!∗) depends 
on innate ability, the combined effect of resource rents and the fraction transferred to 
human capital αΩ!"#, and technologyA!!!. The left hand side of equation (12) shows the 
ratio of probabilities in being a successful relative to a failed entrepreneur while the right 
hand side yields the return ratios from the two states. Given that this equality must hold at 
the optimum level of schooling (s!∗) , any positive resource shock will lead the 
denominator to increase proportionally more than the numerator. Agents will then lower 
their optimum level of schooling and increase investments in entrepreneurship over time. 
This behavior is logical since the utility function has a decreasing absolute risk aversion 
(D.A.R.A.) property. Any increase in resource rents distributed allows agents to enjoy 
higher consumption, where a D.A.R.A. utility function makes individuals less risk averse 
as a result of an income transfer and increase their risk appetite to invest more in 
uncertain projects.  
Proposition 2:  
Part A: For ∀ (q), (0 >q>1), and an innate threshold ability such that 𝑎! < 𝑎! < 1, the 
optimal amount of schooling (𝑠∗) holds if 𝑠! > !!.  Part B: The optimal level of schooling 
(𝑠∗) declines as the level of total resource rents distributed 𝛺!"#  increases. Similarly  
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(𝑠∗) decline with resource rents fraction distributed to human capita (𝛼). However, (𝑠∗) 
increases in the average level of technology  𝐴!!!.  
 
Proof:  
Part A of proposition 2 holds because any value of s!∗ < !! will lead the right hand side of 
equation (12) to be negative, where  [f ! s!∗ − f !(1− s!∗)] > 0 due to the diminishing 
marginal return. Having an s!∗ > !!  can be explained intuitively: Given that individuals are 
risk averse, and entrepreneurial capital is uncertain, people choose to invest in 
entrepreneurial capital only when the expected return is significantly high. To prove part  
B of proposition 2,we use again the implicit function theorem to find the following from 
(12) ( See Appendix A for additional proof): 
 
!!∗!!! > 0  , And !!∗!!! > 0, !!∗!Ω!!"# < 0, !!∗!! < 0                                    (13)          
3.4. MODEL DYNAMICS:  
Suppose at time (t) there exists a situation where 𝑎! > 1 , then no individual will choose 
to invest in human capital. This is seen from equation (14),    𝜇 ≡𝑒! ,𝑝! ,𝛺!"# |[qlnA!!!𝑎! f s! + f 1− s! +αΩ!"#]+ 1− q ln(A!!!𝑎!f s! +
αΩ!"# ≤ ln  [2 ω+ 1− α 𝛺 }    given 𝑎! > 1 ,             (14) 
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where 𝜇 represents the set of all agents who choose to remain unskilled given  𝑎! > 1. 
This is represented by the shaded area in Figures (4) and (5). However, in the case of 𝑎! < 𝑎! < 1, the model dynamics can be illustrated by equations (15) and (16) showing 
the aggregate level of human capital in the long run.        
𝑒!!!   = {! !!!!∗                                                                                                                                             !"          !!!!(!!!)! !!!!∗ !!!                                                                                        !"      !!!!!!!!!                               (15) 
 
𝑝!!!   = {! !!∗                                                                                                                                                         !"      !!!!(!!!)!(!!∗)!!! !"!                                                                                                    !"      !!!!!!                (16)  
From equation (11), and (12)   (𝑠!∗)  and (𝑎!)  are functions of 𝐴!!! 𝑒! ,𝑝! , and αΩ!"#  respectively then, 𝑒!!!   = 𝛴 (𝑒! ,𝑝!),αΩ!"# , and 𝑃!!!   = 𝛣 (𝑒! ,𝑝!),αΩ!"#                    (17)  
Proposition 3:  
For any (q), such that 0 < 𝑞 ≤ 1,  there exists a non-trivial stable steady state 
equilibrium in the space of (𝑒!  ) and (𝑝!)  from equation (15) and (16), if the initial level 
of technology is sufficiently high. 
Proof:  
Proposition 3 can be illustrated graphically by showing that at a given level of 𝑒  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑝, 
and 𝐴   𝑒,𝑝 , there exists 𝑒!!! = 𝑝!!! = 𝑒 = 𝑝.     This observation is obvious from 
equation (12). For simplicity assume that 𝑞 = 1 and 𝑠!∗ = !!  , then 𝑒!!! = 𝑝!!!. Therefore 
for any 𝑒! = 𝑝!  both curves will cross exactly on the 45° line. This stable equilibrium is 
represented by point (y) in Figure 4.   
FIGURE 4: GRAPHICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE MODEL'S DYNAMIC 
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The above graph stipulates that only a sufficiently high average level of initial 
professional and entrepreneurial human capital will lead to a high non-trivial steady state 
represented by point (y), where the 𝑃 = 0  and 𝐸 = 0 loci intersect (see Appendix A for 
proof). Point (x) is not a stable steady state because for any initial level of technology 
(𝐴!) outside  𝐸 = 0 and 𝑃 = 0, the long-term income will converge back to the shaded 
area. Countries starting at an initial level of technology as low as  𝐴!  will end up being 
unskilled as the average level of 𝑒!and 𝑝! decreases in the long run. However, countries 
with a sufficiently high initial level of technology (represented by points A!,A!,A!, and  A!), income will converge to a stable steady state level represented by 
point (y) in the long run.  
Proposition 4: 
An exogenous positive shock to resource rents distributed 𝛺!"#  and/or the fraction 
transferred to human capital (𝛼) leads to a contraction of the convergence region of a 
high-income level, thus increasing the possibility of convergence to a low-level 
equilibrium trap.  
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!
!!!!!
!!!!!
!!=0##
!!
!!!!=0## !!!!!
!!!!!
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26 
Proof:  
Our model shows that resource rent transfers behave as a curse rather than a blessing, as 
they distort the efficient allocation of talent for any positive resource rents shock. From 
proposition 4, as a result of higher   𝛼   and/or  𝛺!"# , those who have 𝑎! > 𝑎! invest less 
in optimum schooling which in turn move   𝐸 = 0 and 𝑃 = 0 loci leading to a significant 
change in the steady state level of income and the overall model’s dynamics. This change 
will lower the incentive to invest in human capital in the long run. Looking at Figure 5, 
one can see the consequences of a positive resource rents shock. If a country encounters 
an increase in distributed resource rents, then professional human capital loci 𝑃  = 0 will 
shift downward to P! = 0  and 𝐸 = 0 to shift rightward to E! = 0. As shown in Figure 5, 𝑃 = 0  will shift downward in a higher magnitude than 𝐸 = 0 shifting rightward due to the 
concavity structure of 𝑓 . . A decrease in (𝑠!) will marginally decrease 𝑓 s!  more than 
the increase in 𝑓 1− s! .  
To see why less people invest in human capital as a result of a resource shock, one can 
analyze the effect of resource rents on countries with technology levels such as A!  and  A! in both Figure 4 (before a resource shock) and Figure 5 (after a resource 
shock). Looking at levels of technology such as A!  and  A!,  one can see that the same 
points lead to a different steady state level of income before the resource shock (Figure 4) 
compared to ex post (Figure 5). If resource rents are not present, countries starting at 
either A!  or  A!  will converge to a high steady state level of income (represented by point 
y) as the average level of human capital increases each period. However, if a country 
encounters a resource shock, 𝐸 = 0 and 𝑃  = 0 will shift to E! = 0  and  P! = 0  respectively 
leading A!  and  A!  to fall outside E! = 0  and  P! = 0  curves. As a result of positive 
resource shock, countries with an initial technology levels such as A!  and  A! are not 
capable to increase income as both types of human capital decreases overtime. Figure 5 
explains that due to resource windfalls, countries with an initial technology that is exactly 
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at the border of 𝐸 = 0 and 𝑃  = 0 ex ante will be negatively affected by the positive 
resource rent shock due to the changes in growth dynamics ex post. One interesting 
observation is that an over accumulation of one type of human capital relative to the other 
(such as the technology level A!) may still result in a higher growth in the long run. 
However, this is constrained by the minimum level of professional human capital17. In 
reality there are very few countries where they have a lot of actually innovative 
entrepreneurs and at the same time not too many highly educated workers.  So, the 
chance of being in that region is significantly small.  
Our findings explain why countries such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, Kuwait, Oman, and 
Venezuela may experience a low level of skilled labor and a low level of technology in 
the long run compared to countries such as, Canada, and Norway. Usually, advanced 
resource rich economies are highly endowed with technology where the effect of resource 
shocks is negligible. Further, any positive shock to technology works in an opposite 
manner compared to resource shock. One can conclude that resource rents transfers and 
technology works in opposite directions.  
FIGURE 5:  THE EFFECT OF NATURAL RESOURCE ON SCHOOLING AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP AFTER A 
RESOURCE SHOCK   
 
Figure 5 describes the effect of natural resources on human capital accumulation after a 
positive shock in resource rent. The figure demonstrates that due to their higher level of 
                                                
17 As assumed earlier the level of technology 𝐴 𝑒, 𝑝  is a function of the average level of both types of 
human capital. This explains why a minimum level of  both types of human capital is needed.  
!!!!!!
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overall technology, only higher income countries escape the resource curse. However, 
resource shocks have more influence on lower-income countries, as those countries will 
eventually converge back to a low or unskilled labor economy being caught in a 
development trap.  
3.5. FINAL IMPLICATIONS 
The aim of this theoretical model is to explain the role of natural resources in hampering 
investments in human capital accumulation if resource rents are distributed as lump-sum 
transfer. Including natural capital rents in an overlapping generation model clarifies how 
incentives are distorted when it comes to the decision of choosing what skills to acquire. 
From our model presented above, if developing countries are rich in resources, any 
income transfer to the society at large will be devastating to human capital investments. 
While resource rent transfers have a minimal negative effect on developed countries 
especially if they invested enough in technological advancements and innovation upfront.  
The main finding is that natural resource rich countries are likely to be characterized by a 
low level of innovation and technology associated with a high level of unskilled 
industries, due to the inefficient allocation of resource rents over time. Regardless of how 
rich in natural capital these countries are, if resources are distributed directly to 
individual’s income they will converge back to a relatively low level of GDP per-capita 
measured by the technology parameter (𝐴!). Looking at the curse from the incentive 
corner, our findings justify that government in most developing resource rich countries 
are not capable of locating their nations on a positive human capital growth path even 
though resource rents are tremendously high, and capabilities to invest in technologies 
are high as well.  
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The distribution of resource rents to the society at large is a crucial policy. Besides the 
nations that were discussed earlier, one specific case namely Alaska where the state law 
says that the resource fund must distribute half of the investment earnings on an equal per 
capita basis through transfers (Frankel 2010). Sala-I-Martin and Subramanian (2003) also 
suggest that Nigeria should similarly distribute its oil earnings on an equal per capita 
basis, and Birdsall and Subramanian (2004) make the same proposal for Iraq. However, 
our research indicates that government policies that depend on distributing generated 
rents as income transfers will discourage investments in human capital, and keep agents 
wellbeing almost under the mercy of transfers fluctuations, especially in countries that 
have a low initial level of technology to start with. Our research tries to fill a gap that has 
not been discovered by the previous literature, hence giving a better understanding of one 
of the most important policy issue that resource rich countries are facing.  
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APPENDIX A:   
 
I. Proposition 1: 
 
Using the implicit function theorem and equation (11) one can prove the following:  
!!!!!! < 0, !!!!!! < 0 !!!!!! < 0   𝜕𝑎𝑡𝜕𝛺𝑛𝑒𝑡 > 0 let,  
 𝐹 𝑒! ,𝑝! ,𝛼! = 𝐹( 𝑞𝑙𝑛{[𝐴!!!𝑎![𝑓 𝑠! + 𝑓 1− 𝑠! ]+ 𝛼𝛺!"#}+ 1− 𝑞 𝑙𝑛{𝐴!!!𝑎!𝑓(𝑠!)+𝛼𝛺!"#}− ln  {𝜔  + 2 1− 𝛼 𝛺!"#} = 0  ), 
 
then,   
!!!!!! = − !!!!!! < 0 , !!!!!! = − !!!!!! < 0,   !!!!!! = − !!!  !!! < 0 
,   !!!!!!"# = − !!!!"!!! > 0 
 
II. Proposition 2: 
 
!"#!!    𝐸[𝑈 𝑐!!!  ! |𝑡] = [𝑞𝑙𝑛 𝑐!!!! !"#$%% + 1− 𝑞 𝑙𝑛 𝑐!!!! !"#$%&']   
Subject to:    Y!!!! =    Y!!!! ! +   Y!!!! ! 
 
The first order condition (F.S.O) with respect to (𝑠!):  
𝜕 𝐸[𝑈 𝑐!!!  ! |𝑡𝜕𝑠! =    𝑞𝐴𝑡+1  𝑎𝑖 𝑓′ 𝑠𝑖 − 𝑓′ 1 − 𝑠𝑖{At+1ai[f 𝑠𝑖 + f 1 − 𝑠𝑖 ] +αΩnet} + 1 − 𝑞 𝐴𝑡+1𝑎𝑖𝑓′ 𝑠𝑖𝐴𝑡+1𝑎𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼𝛺𝑛𝑒𝑡      
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 This can be written as:  𝜕𝐸[𝑈 𝑐!!!  ! |𝑡𝜕𝑠! =   𝑞𝐴𝑡+1  𝑎𝑖 𝑓′ 𝑠𝑖 − 𝑓′ 1 − 𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑡+2𝑖 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 + 1 − 𝑞 𝐴𝑡+1𝑎𝑖𝑓′ 𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑡+2𝑖 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒        
taking the second order condition (S.O.C) with respect to (𝑠!) :  𝜕!𝐸[𝑈 𝑐!!!  ! |𝑡𝜕!𝑠!
= 𝑞𝐴𝑡+1  𝑎𝑖 𝑓′′ 𝑠𝑖 + 𝑓′′ 1 − 𝑠𝑖 . 𝑐𝑡+2𝑖 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 − 𝑞𝐴𝑡+12 𝑎𝑖2 𝑓′ 𝑠𝑖 − 𝑓′ 1 − 𝑠𝑖 2𝑐𝑡+2𝑖 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠2
+ 1 − 𝑞 𝐴𝑡+1𝑎𝑖𝑓′′ 𝑠𝑖    𝑐𝑡+2𝑖 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒   − 1 − 𝑞 𝐴𝑡+12 𝑎𝑖2 𝑓′ 𝑠𝑖 2𝑐𝑡+2𝑖 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒2      < 0   
 
To prove the following condition: !!∗!!! > 0, And !!∗!!! > 0, !!∗!Ω!!"# < 0, !!∗!!! > 0 we also use 
the implicit function theorem from equation (12). Let,  
 𝐺 𝑠! , 𝑒! ,𝑝! ,𝛺!"# = 𝐺{ !!!!   + {  {!!!!!![! !!∗ !! !!!!∗ ]!!!!"#}!!!!!!! !!∗ !!!!"# ∗ !! !!∗!! !!∗ !!! !!!!∗ } = 0} then,  
 
!!∗!!! = − !!!!!!∗ > 0  , !!∗!!! = − !!!!!!∗ >0, !!∗!!!"# = − !!!"#!!!∗ <  0 
 
III. Proposition 3 and 4: 
 
Assume the following: 𝐸 = 0  , 𝑃 = 0 will not intersect with the shaded area i.e. :  
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 𝜇 = (𝑒! ,𝑝! ,𝛺!"# |𝑞𝑙𝑛[𝐴!!!𝑎! 𝑓 𝑠! + 𝑓 1− 𝑠! + 𝛼𝛺!"#+    1− 𝑞 𝑙𝑛{𝐴!!!𝑎!𝑓(𝑠!)+ 𝛼𝛺!"#}− ln  {𝜔  + 2 1− 𝛼 𝛺!"#> 0}   
 
 1-   From 𝑃 = 0 = p!!! − 𝑝! = 0      , 𝑎𝑛𝑑      𝐸 = 0 = e!!! − 𝑒! = 0, equation (15) and (16)  
and given  0 < 𝑎! < 1 , one can prove the following : 
  
!!!!!! |𝐸 = − !!!!!!  , and !!!!!! |𝐸  will be negative if 𝛴! > 1, and positive otherwise. 
 
!!!!!! |𝑃 = − !!!!!! , and   !!!!!! |𝑃 will be negative when 𝛣! > 1,  and positive otherwise. 
 
The slope of  𝐸 = 0 and 𝑃 = 0 will have the following characteristics:  
A-For a given small value of “e”  !!!!!! |𝐸 < 0, however as “e” goes to ∞, !!!!!! |𝐸 > 0 
 
B- For a given small value of “p” !!!!!! |𝑃 < 0, however as “p” goes to ∞,  !!!!!! |𝑃 > 0 
 
C- Given that 𝑠! ,𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑎! are continuous on 𝑒!𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑝!, there exist a value 𝑝′,𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑒′ 
such that !!!!!! |𝑃 = 0   
 
D- Given that 𝑠! ,𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎! are continuous on 𝑒!𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑝! , there exist a value 𝑝′,𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑒′  
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such that !!!!!! |𝐸 = 0.  
 
Points A, B, C, D justify the shape of 𝐸 = 0 and 𝑃 = 0 loci in the space of 𝑒!  and  𝑝! .   
 
2- We will show that there exist a non-trivial steady state to exist for a given value of 𝑒! and 𝑝!.  
Assume a value of q=1, then equation (12) will hold only if, f !(s∗) = f ! 1− s∗ = f′ !! . 
Then,  𝑒!!! = 𝑝!!! = 1− a 𝑓(!!) . Given this, for any value of e and p, (e∗,p∗), such 
that e∗ = p∗on 𝑃 = 0, and a value of e and p, (e,p), such that (e = p) on 𝐸 = 0  ,  then e = p = e∗ = p∗ and there exist a steady state exactly on the intersection of 𝑃 =0  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝐸 = 0  𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑖 . Further both 𝑃 = 0,𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝐸 = 0    must intersect exactly at a 45° 
straight line.  
 
3- To test the effect of resource rents on the shape of 𝑃  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝐸  𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑖, then given the optimum 
level of schooling from equation (12), and using the implicit function theorem, !"∗!!!!"# <0. This will shift the 𝐸,𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑃, in different directions since 𝐸,𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑃, are continuous on 
(s*).  
To prove that the curves are shifting one can divide both curves p!!! − 𝑝! = 0, and e!!! − 𝑒! = 0  by each other,  
p! = f(s!)f(1− s!) 𝑒! 
This shows that the steady state location is changing with (𝑠!) 
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THE EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT TRANSFERS ON HUMAN 
CAPITAL IN RESOURCE RICH COUNTRIES 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
We present dynamic panel data and cross section models to see the effect of natural 
resource rents transfers on human capital accumulation. We use tertiary education as a 
human capital indicator, since at this educational level, people choose to accumulate 
professional skills and direct their talents to sectors with the highest expected return. 
Using a dynamic panel data model, one can see that the combined effect of government 
transfers and natural resource rents per labor have a negative and statistically significant 
effect on human capital. However, using a cross section analysis for the same purpose, 
we show that not only the combined effect of resource rents per labor and government 
transfers have a negative and significant effect on tertiary education, but also resource 
rents per labor have a negative and significant effect on tertiary education.  
 
Our empirical models employed in this research are related to various studies in the 
economic growth literature: Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) studied the effect of 
secondary education on economic growth, Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997, 2001) showed 
that economies with a high ratio of natural resource exports to GDP in 1970 (as a base 
year) tended to grow slowly during the subsequent 20-year period 1970-1990. Using 
cross-country evidence, Gylfason (2001) reviewed the relationship between natural 
resource dependence and economic growth. He particularly stressed how natural capital 
intensity tends to crowd out social capital, human capital, physical capital, and financial 
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capital, thereby impeding economic growth across countries. Sala-I-Martin and 
Subramanian (2003) showed that Nigerian long term low growth is blamed on the wastes 
and corruption from oil rather than the Dutch disease. Bravo-Ortega and De Gregorio 
(2005) showed that having a large level of human capital can offset the resource curse. In 
a panel data model, they studied the interaction between human capital and natural 
resources, showing that high levels of human capital may outweigh the negative effects 
of the natural resource abundance on growth.  
There are two factors that distinguish this study from the earlier ones discussed above. 
First, given the theoretical structure of our model in chapter one, our hypothesis is not 
that natural resources have a positive or negative effect on human capital accumulation, 
nor that transfer have a positive or negative effect on human capital accumulation; rather 
that the interaction of lump-sum transfer and resource rents have a deleterious impact on 
the incentive to accumulate human capital. Our argument states that countries having a 
high level of natural rents per person experience a negative effect on human capital 
accumulation if these rents are distributed as unconditional government transfers. This 
unique aspect derived from the model, has not been examined before. Second, previous 
studies focused on secondary education as a measure for human capital, while we focus 
on tertiary education in our analysis. Not only has this measure been somewhat neglected 
in the literature, we also believe that it is more pertinent to the notion of specialization 
and skills, and crucial to technological innovation and the process of economic growth.  
 
Our paper employs two empirical methodologies to study the effect of transfers on 
human capital. First, using a dynamic panel data fixed effect model, we see that the 
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combined effect of government transfers and natural resource rents has a negative and 
statistically significant effect on the conditional mean of human capital. Further, if we 
classify countries by the level of dependence on resources rents and by regions, our 
results do not change. Second, to study the combined effect of resource rents and 
government transfers on human capital between different countries, we employ a cross 
section analysis. We show that the combined effect of natural resource rents and 
government transfers have a negative effect on human capital. Further, over a 30 years 
average, resource rents per labor have a negative and significant effect on tertiary 
education. This negative effect of resource rents per labor coincides with the resource 
curse literature as natural capital rents hinder social capital such as physical and human 
capital.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 conducts a brief review of 
the literature on natural resources and human capital investments, stressing on the 
transfers literature that is most relevant to our analysis. Section 3 presents the model 
estimations, covering both methods; dynamic panel data analysis, as well as the cross 
section analysis to support our theoretical findings explained in chapter one. Section 4 
includes concluding results, and policy recommendations.  
2. BRIEF REVIEW  
2.1.  HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMATION IN RESOURCE RICH COUNTRIES 
Numerous studies used two measures of government spending on education merely 
government expenditures on education and skill accumulation as a fraction of total GDP 
and school enrollments. Both measures found to be negatively related to the level of 
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natural resources (Gylfason, Herbertsson, and Zoega 1999). Birdsall, Pinckney and Sabot 
(2001) showed that resource-rich countries invest less in trainings and skills 
accumulation than resource-poor countries. Looking at resource-poor countries in Asia, 
average secondary school enrollment was 60 percent during the 1980s, compared to only 
38 percent average enrollment in resource abundant countries (World Bank 2010). Poor 
performance was also reported for Northern Africa, and Latin America.  
 
If we slightly recast the relations between human capital and natural resource rents using 
tertiary education instead of secondary education, results does not change. We show in 
Figure 2 the there is a negative relation between natural resource rents and tertiary 
education for 46 countries. One interesting observation is that resource dependent 
countries, especially those in the MENA region were part of the worst performing group 
for the past 30 years. However, a unique example of a positive correlation between 
tertiary education and natural rents per labor is Norway. As a natural resource rich 
country, Norway always perceived its natural resources as a blessing combined with an 
educated labor force, which made it easier for the Norwegian society to control resources 
windfalls (World Bank 2010). It is evident in Norway that human capital accumulation 
was a significant driver behind the economic prosperity, while natural capital was a 
secondary driver as rents are saved for future generations. A World Bank study has 
shown that on average 60 percent of Norway’s national wealth was related to intangible 
capital, including human capital and skills, and only 13 percent to natural capital (World 
Bank, 2010). 
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FIGURE 4: NATURAL RESOURCES PER-CAPITA OF GDP AND TERTIARY EDUCATION ENROLLMENT  
 
Source: By the authors  
 
Various reasons can be identified to explain this downward slope in the above curve. 
First, the issue of comparative advantage can play a significant role for the adverse effect 
of resources on human capital. For example, Behbudi, Mamipour and Karami (2010) 
have argued that countries endowed with large natural reserves, find it easier to engage 
chiefly in the production or extraction of such resources, since their comparative 
advantage in these resources means low levels of required initial investments. But 
production or extraction in resource-based industries does not require an intensive level 
of human capital as compared to sectors such as manufacturing. Thus, the exploitation of 
such resources comes at the expense of social services, in particular human capital 
development. Likewise, Gylfason (2001) argues that a focus on natural resource as the 
main source of national income retards the development of the manufacturing sector, 
because skilled jobs are scarce and hence returns to human capital are low. Birdsall, 
Pinckney and Sabot (2001) argue that due to lower return in such countries, citizens do 
not find it necessary to pressure governments to provide skill intensive sectors. 
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Second, Beck (2010) claims that aside from price increase, the resource curse distorts the 
incentives to invest in human capital because of higher windfall gains from natural 
resource rents. Profits generated from resource rents are considered short-term profits 
compared to manufacturing plants, equipment, and machinery returns. Furthermore, these 
profits depend less on market creation, human capital, and on research and development 
(R&D) investments (Besley and Persson, 2011). All these factors contribute to low 
incentives to invest in types of human capital specifically tertiary education.  It is also 
crucial to point out that if countries fail to invest in human capital, it will be difficult for 
them to move away from their dependence on resources to more sophisticated products in 
the long run. Over the past fifty years mainly Finland and South Korea managed to 
escape from depending on their resource income toward more sophisticated 
manufacturing. Further, these countries have a higher level of human capital compared to 
other countries (Gelb 2010). However, most resource dependent countries especially 
those that have high resource rents per labor among others have a low level of human 
capital. Anecdotal evidence from Table 1 suggests that resource rich industrialized 
countries do exhibit higher tertiary education while, for example, resource rich countries 
of the MENA region that are highly dependent on resources have a generally lower levels 
tertiary education.  
TABLE 1: AVERAGE TERTIARY EDUCATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EDUCATION 
High	  Human	  Capital	  
Countries	  
30	  years	  average	  
percentage	  	  
of	  	  tertiary	  education	  	  	  
Low	  Human	  Capital	  
Countries	  	  
30	  years	  average	  
percentage	  	  
of	  	  tertiary	  education	  	  	  
Australia	   0.531	   Bahrain	   0.121	  
Canada	   0.714	   Kuwait	   0.123	  
Norway	   0.525	   Oman	   0.073	  
United	  States	   0.694	   Qatar	   0.173	  
New	  Zealand	   0.343	   Saudi	  Arabia	   0.169	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2.2. HUMAN CAPITAL, NATURAL RESOURCES AND TRANSFERS  
Over the past 30 years transfer policies were the most famous tool to boost education 
investments, especially in Latin American countries. These transfer programs are 
classified into two types: conditional cash transfers and unconditional cash transfers. 
Conditional transfers are focused on households conditional on specific guidelines that 
shall be fulfilled such as school enrollment. Generally, these transfers are a popular 
public policy especially in Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia. Conditional cash 
transfers showed effectiveness, mainly on early stages of education (for young children in 
pre-school and primary education), but there is shallow or no evidence on the effect of 
transfers on human capital in resource rich countries, especially at the tertiary level.  
There are also various governmental unconditional cash transfers (UCTs) directed to an 
individual’s income to cover a wide range of needs in different countries. UCTs are 
defined as government distribution of wealth with no conditions assuming that 
individuals will behave rationally (UK Aid, 2011). Usually, resource rich-countries 
distribute unconditional cash transfers to the society at large, without generating future 
taxes. Oil-producing countries do provide this form of lump-sum unconditional transfers, 
potentially to placate society or reduce the risk of social unrest. For example, the Kuwaiti 
authorities spent 4.12 billion dinars in 2008 on lump-sum transfers to national citizens, 
which correspond to 43% of government aggregate expenditures (Elkatiri et. al. 2011). 
Further evidence of such transfers in resource rich countries can be found in the case of 
Saudi Arabia (IMF, 2012). These transfers show up in the form of wage premia that stem 
from oil rents. To indicate the extent of such transfers, one can compare wages of Saudi 
nationals with those of foreign workers. According to the IMF 2012, Saudi national’s 
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non-skilled labor income is 4.1 times higher than that of the expatriates. To link 
government transfers with resource rents, Gelb and Decker (2011) argued that average 
fiscal revenues from natural resources in 14 Middle Eastern natural resources exporter 
countries were around 57.2% of total revenues. Further, in most countries with high 
resource rents per person and/or high resource rents per GDP, income transfers to the 
society stems mainly from resource rents, as these countries have a lower tax rates 
compared to other countries18. 
In general, there is limited evidence on the effect of transfers on human capital 
accumulation mainly tertiary education. Regardless of the types of transfers, research 
showed welfare improvement only when rents were distributed to boost consumption 
(World Bank, 2011). Yet, the literature on cash transfers claims that these welfare 
transfers increase dependency and undesirable behavior (Heinrich 2011). Heinrich argued 
that cash transfers increased the society’s welfare through fulfilling short term 
consumption needs, and at the same time did not promote long term goals such as 
investments in human capital accumulation and human development. One can conclude 
that there is a lot to be learned about the effect of transfers on the incentive to invest in 
human capital. Resource-rich countries shall realize that cash transfers to the society at 
large, especially those that are stemming from resource rents, will not effectively promote 
human capital accumulation in the long run. It is obvious from the previous literature that 
transfers might work if these transfers are directly target issues such as poverty and 
health.  
                                                
18 According to the 2012 CIA fact-book, the majority of resource rich developing countries have tax rates 
below ten percent, and some of them go down to zero percent.       
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3.EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
This part will examine how natural resources, government transfers, and human capital 
interact. As was discovered in previous sections and relating to the literature of economic 
growth, the effect of natural resource rents on human capital and economic growth is 
negative. Further, the key innovation in our theoretical model in essay one was to show 
the effect of lump-sum transfer, αΩ!"#, to reduce the incentive to accumulate human 
capital. In this section we will add an additional evidence to support our theoretical 
results empirically through showing the influence of resource rents and government 
transfers on schooling using tertiary education as an indicator of human capital. First, we 
examine the effect of transfers on human capital while resource rents are present by using 
five years averages of tertiary education between 1980-2009. Using five years averages 
of tertiary education coincide with major conventional analysis linking education and 
human capital with economic growth specifically Barro (2000). The implication of this 
analysis will be determined using a dynamic panel data of 45 countries. Second, we 
capture the long-term effect of resource rents and government transfers on human capital 
between countries using a cross section analysis.  
3.1.  DYNAMIC PANEL DATA  
The dynamic panel data model employed in our analysis follows the following general 
form, 𝑦!" = α+ β!y!(!!!) + 𝛽!𝑍!" + 𝛽!𝑋!" + 𝑢! + 𝜓! + 𝜖!" 
A dynamic estimator is used as we seek to analyze a panel data that have dynamic 
relation overtime.  It is clear from the economic growth literature that the initial levels of 
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education are considered as a base for higher growth. From our hypothesis above, our 
benchmark equation is as follows19 
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐸𝑑𝑢!" = α + β!𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐸𝑑𝑢!"!! +     𝛽!𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠  𝑝𝑒𝑟  𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟  !" + β!𝐺𝑜𝑣.𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠!"           + β!(𝐺𝑜𝑣.𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒  𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠  𝑝𝑒𝑟  𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜r)!"+β!𝑋!" +   𝑢𝑖+𝜓𝑡+ 𝜖!"         
We use Arellano-Bover and Blundell-Bond estimator for the above model due to the 
following reasons: First, the regressors might be endogenous as some of the control 
variables might have a causality that is going in both directions. Second, the lagged 
dependent variable 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐸𝑑𝑢!"!! is correlated with the first difference of the error term. 
Arellano-Bover and Blundell-Bond estimation starts through transforming regressors to 
eliminate the country specific intercept 𝑢! , and then one can use instruments for 
regressors that might be endogenous. Further, Arellano-Bover and Blundell-Bond 
estimation instruments the lag of the dependent variable 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐸𝑑𝑢!"!!  by 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐸𝑑𝑢!"!!  to avoid autocorrolation.  In this model we assume a sequential moment 
restriction to insure that our independent variables are sequentially exogenous conditional 
on the unobserved effect.  
𝐸 𝜖!" 𝑋!" ,𝑋!"!!,… .𝑋!!,𝑢! = 0   
The above assumption insures that using the first difference as an instrumental variable is 
sequentially exogenous.  
                                                
19 See Appendix B for variables specifications.  
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Here, "Tertiary Edu” and its lagged value “𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐸𝑑𝑢!"!!" are defined as the tertiary 
education enrollment as a percentage of total population of tertiary education age. Five 
years average data from 1980 to 2009 is collected from the World Bank Development 
Indicators including both sexes. Resource Rents per labor is the measure of resource 
profit generated per unit of labor. According to the World Bank Development Indicators, 
natural resource rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents, mineral rents, 
and forest rents, net of cost. Gov. Transfers represent government transfers as a 
percentage of total government expenses. We examine the effect of government transfers 
on tertiary education, where mainly these transfers stem from resource rents in resource 
rich countries, as taxes in most developing and least developing resource rich nations are 
minimal.  𝐺𝑜𝑣.𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒  𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠  𝑝𝑒𝑟  𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟  captures the combined effect of natural 
resources and government transfers on tertiary education over time and across countries. 
We consider this variable as a proxy of the 𝛼𝛺!"#  innovation in our theoretical model.  
This variable examines the effect of government transfers on countries that have a high 
level of resource rents per person. As mentioned earlier, most resource rich countries 
have a tax rate that is less than 10 percent where most government transfers stems from 
resource rents. Finally, 𝑋!"   is a set of other control variables including education 
expenditures as a percentage of total expenses, GDP per capita, foreign direct 
investments as a percentage of GDP, savings rates, time dummies,  and terms of trade as 
a percentage of GDP. 
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3.1.2. MODELS ESTIMATION  
Table 1 presents our results from the dynamic panel data regressions. First, we use a data 
set that includes 44 countries, and then for robustness we stratified two data sets from our 
original sample based on different country characteristics such as the level of resource 
dependence, and MENA region countries. This was done to capture the effect disparity of 
resource rents and government transfers on tertiary education. Looking at government 
transfers and resource rents per labor in all three regressions, each variable alone has a 
negligible effect on tertiary education. However, the key result is that the combined 
effect of transfers and natural resource rents per labor is negative and significant at a less 
than 5% significance level. Further this negative effect is persistent in resource dependent 
and MENA region countries.   
From regression (1), if the product of resource rents per labor and government transfers 
increases by one unit, tertiary education will decrease by 3.06 units20. If we investigate 
only resource rich dependent countries, one can see that the combined effect of resource 
rents per labor and government transfers have also a negative and significant effect on 
tertiary education. From regression (2), a one-percentage increase in the product of 
resource rents per labor and government transfers will decrease tertiary education by 
2.127 percent. Looking at the MENA region, an increase in (government 
transfers*resource rents per labor) by one percentage point will decrease tertiary 
education by 2.8 percent. One interesting observation is that the initial level of tertiary 
education has a significant effect on the path of tertiary education only in regression (1) 
                                                
20  (Government transfers*resource rents per labor) is expressed by 1/10000 of a unit.  
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and (2). However, in MENA region countries, the initial level of tertiary education is not 
significant.  
Additional observations are as follows: looking at regression (1) public spending on 
education has a positive and significant effect on tertiary education. An increase in one 
percentage point of public spending as a percentage of total government expenditures will 
increase tertiary education by 2.6 percentage points. However, looking at regression (2) 
and (3), the effect of public spending on tertiary education is negligible. These results are 
expected as most resource rich dependent countries have relatively inefficient 
government spending associated with a high level of rent seeking activities and 
corruption21. 
In this dynamic panel data model, our empirical findings adds more evidence to our 
theoretical interpretation in chapter one, on how resource rent transfers lower the 
incentive to invest in schooling. The adverse role of resources via lump sum transfers is 
brought home further, when we note that either variable alone exhibits a negative and 
significant effect. Our findings in Table 2 showed that for five years averages of tertiary 
education, it is not the level of natural resource endowment that matters. What matters is 
how these resource rents are distributed and their effect on the level of human capital. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
21 Besides Norway, and according to the International Country Risk Guide, countries such as Saudi Arabia 
has a corruption level of 2.5 out of 5, Kuwait 2.3 out of 5, Iran 1.75 out of 5, and Venezuela 2.8 out of 5. 
These numbers are based on averages of 25 years of data for each country.   
  
 
50 
TABLE 2: DYNAMIC PANEL DATA TO STUDY THE COMBINED EFFECT OF TRANSFERS AND RESOURCE RENTS ON        
HUMAN CAPITAL 
	  
All 
Countries  
Resource Dependent 
Countries  MENA Region  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Lag of tertiary education 1.159 1.243 0.021 
 (12.92)** (9.39)** -(0.08) 
Lag log gdp-per capita -0.093 -0.196 0.172 
 -0.51 -1.79 -(1.19) 
Lag FDI 0.012 0.007 -0.003 
 -(1.47) -(1.17) -(0.74) 
Resource rents per labor  0.506 0.304 0.202 
 -(1.05) -(0.08) -(0.06) 
Gov. transfers 0.106 0.054 -0.042 
 -(1.46) -(0.46) -(0.26) 
Gov. transfers* resource rents per labor  -3.063 -2.127 -2.887 
 -(2.39)* -(2.52)* -(3.14)** 
Education expenditures 2.627 1.755 -1.292 
 (3.11)** -(1.65) -(1.26) 
Tax revenues per gdp   0.042 0.24 0.651 
 -(0.25) -(1.07) (2.60)** 
Terms of trade  -0.002 0.018 0.019 
 -(0.05) -(0.30) -(0.41) 
Democracy -0.017 -0.03 -0.013 
 -(1.13) -(1.58) -(0.90) 
Time dummies  ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Constant 0.1 -0.104 -0.075 
 -(0.62) -(0.68) -(0.53) 
N 220 60 56 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are t statistics. Variables were taken from the World Bank Indicators. Note that the       
significance level is: *p<0.05; **p<0.01. Model (1) includes our overall sample including resource rich and resource poor 
countries. Model (2) represents countries with resource rents higher than 20% of total GDP. Model (3) represents resource 
countries in the MENA region.   
 
In addition to the models employed above, we tested if results are robust to different 
model specifications such as trying different natural resource rents variable specification, 
different types of education, and different time brackets. First, we used resource rents per 
gdp instead of resource rents per labor and secondary education instead of tertiary 
education. The combined effect of resource rents per gdp and transfers have the same 
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statistical effect on tertiary education as resource rents per labor. However, the effect of 
government transfers and human capital is positive and not statistically significant on 
secondary education.  
Second, employing a dynamic panel data model with annual data of tertiary education, 
our results coincide with table 2. The combined effect of resource rents and government 
transfers is negative and statistically significant on tertiary education. 
3.2.  CROSS SECTION ESTIMATION  
Table 1 highlighted the combined effect of resource rents per labor and government 
transfers using averages of five years of tertiary education. In Table 2 we study the same 
combined effect of resource rents and government transfers on human capital between 
countries through averaging over the entire period (An average of all years between 1980 
and 2009).  Our benchmark equation is as follows,  𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐸𝑑𝑢! = α +     𝛽!𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒  𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠  𝑝𝑒𝑟  𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟! + β!𝐺𝑜𝑣. 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠!           + β!(𝐺𝑜𝑣.𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒  𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠  𝑝𝑒𝑟  𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜r)!+β!𝑋! + 𝜖!          
In this cross section regression we added additional control variables such as the stock of 
technology, and corruption, that might influence tertiary education enrollment in the 
longer run. To see the effect of technological advancement, we utilize the Technological 
Output Index22 to measure the innovation level. Technology output is measured as a 
weighted average of knowledge creation, knowledge impact, and knowledge diffusion. 
                                                
22 Technology output was taken from the Global Innovation Index. The index was created through a joint effort by 
INSEAD, Cornell University, and World Intellectual Property Organization.  
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We also added democracy and corruption to control for the institutional performance in 
our studied countries. 23 
3.2.1 MODELS ESTIMATION 
Looking at Table 2, one can see that not only the combined effect of resource rents per 
labor and government transfers have a negative effect on tertiary education, but also 
resource rents per labor alone have a negative and significant effect on tertiary education 
as well. Our results coincide with the natural resource curse literature as natural resources 
have a long-term negative effect on social capital investments such as tertiary education. 
A one unit increases in resource rents per labor; will significantly decreases tertiary 
education by .124 units. This ties well with our previous theoretical model reflecting the 
increase in Ωnet . Specifically, any increase in Ωnet will increase the threshold innate 
ability to invest in human capital, and decrease the overall level of income.  
Additional to the resource curse effect, the combined effect of resource rents and 
government transfers have a negative and significant effect on tertiary education among 
44 countries. For countries having a high level of resource rents per labor, an increase in 
government transfers by one unit; reduce tertiary education by 1.179 units. One 
interesting observation is that the initial level of tertiary education can significantly 
influence tertiary education enrollment in the short run (Table 1), and the long run (Table 
2). From Table 2, an increase of 1 percent in the 1980’s level of tertiary education, will 
improve tertiary education by 0.6 percent between countries. Further, looking at the 
                                                
23 In this cross section analysis we try different regressions, including a regression with the same number of variables as 
our dynamic panel regressions reported in table 1). However results are not robust due to the high degree of 
endogeniety. The reported regression in table 2 includes additional control variables so to reduce the endogeneity issue 
and increase the robustness of our results. (Please see Table 4 in Appendix A)  
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combined effect of technological output and resource rents shows that any improvement 
in technological output index will significantly increase tertiary education. If the 
combined effect of technology output and resource rents per labor increase by 1 unit, 
tertiary education will increase by .008 units.  
 
TABLE 3: CROSS SECTION MODEL TO STUDY THE COMBINED EFFECT OF RESOURCE RENTS AND 
GOVERNMENT TRANSFERS ON TERTIARY EDUCATION. 
	  	  
Robust standard  
errors  
Initial tertiary education 0.609 
 (2.06)* 
Resource rents per labor  -0.124 
 -(2.05)* 
Gov. transfers 0.22 
 (2.19)* 
Gov. transfers* resource rents per labor  -1.791 
 -(2.17)* 
Education expenditures -0.739 
 -(1.04) 
Tax revenues per gdp   -0.036 
 -(0.21) 
Terms of trade  0.03 
 -(0.59) 
Democracy 0.016 
 (0.99) 
Log gdp per capita 0.028	  
 -(1.38)	  
Savings  -0.204 
 
-(1.23) 
Corruption	   0.047 
	  
(1.74) 
Technology output  -0.003 
	  
-(2.49)* 
Technology output* resource rents per labor  0.008 
	  
(2.63)* 
Constant  -0.186 
	  
-(1.50) 
R2 0.82 
N 44 
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Notes: The numbers in parentheses are t statistics. Variables were taken from the World Bank Development   
Indicators. Note that the significance level is: *p<0.05; **p<0.01 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
In our analysis, both the dynamic panel data and the cross section models show that, as 
government transfers increases in countries with high natural resource rents per person 
investments in schooling will decrease, and the effect is statistically significant. We find 
that government transfers that stem from resource rents distort human capital investments 
over time especially in human capital scarce economies. The empirics showed a negative 
and significant relationship between the interaction of government transfers with natural 
resource rents, and human capital (tertiary education). The empirical models presented 
above show how natural resources might retard the incentives of individuals to invest in 
human capital if rents are transferred to the society at large. Our findings justify why 
resource rich countries such as the MENA region or parts of Latin America, which may 
consider income transfers as their preferred policy, end up with a low level of human 
capital, relative to others along the growth path. According to our models explained 
above transfers make it more difficult to invest in tertiary education especially in 
countries that have a high resource rents per person.  
In both, the theoretical and empirical models in chapter one and two, our results present a 
thorough understanding of an economic development issue in resource rich countries. 
Our findings facilitate effective formulation and implementation of efficient and 
successful government policies in resource abundant countries, especially in countries 
that are not able to build a higher human capital stock. Eventually, public policy needs to 
be assessed in terms of its contribution to development. 
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                     APPENDIX A:   
 
TABLE 4: CROSS SECTION MODEL TO STUDY THE COMBINED EFFECT OF RESOURCE RENTS AND GOVERNMENT 
TRANSFERS ON TERTIARY EDUCATION. 
	  	  
(1) (2) (3)  
Initial tertiary education 0.489 0.508 0.609 
 (1.42) (1.47) (2.02) 
Resource rents per labor  -0.046 -0.14 -0.124 
 -(1.49) -(2.11)* -(2.05)* 
Gov. transfers 0.11 0.279 0.22 
 (1.18) (2.57)* (2.19)* 
Gov. transfers* resource rents per labor  0.64 -1.816 -1.791 
 (0.80) -(1.59) -(2.17)* 
Education expenditures 0.599 0.154 -0.739 
 -(0.62) -(0.16) -(1.04) 
Tax revenues per gdp   0.025 0.013 -0.036 
 -(0.12) -(0.07) -(0.21) 
Terms of trade  -0.03 0.023 0.03 
 -(0.60) -(0.41) -(0.59) 
Democracy 0.02 0.023 0.016 
 (1.21) (1.39) (0.99) 
FDI 0.006 -0.015 
	   -(0.43) -(0.71) 
	  Log gdp per capita 0.053 0.042 0.028 
 (2.24)* -(1.80) -(1.38) 
Savings 	  
	  
-0.37 -0.204 
	   	  
-(1.49) -(1.23) 
Corruption 
	   	  
0.047 
	   	   	  
(1.74) 
Technology output  
	  
-0.002 -0.003 
	   	  
-(1.85) -(2.49)* 
Technology output* resource rents per labor  
	  
0.008 0.008 
	   	  
(2.23)* (2.63)* 
Constant  -0.352 -0.21 -0.186 
 (2.28)* -(1.35) -(1.50) R2 0.77 0.8 0.82 
N 44 44 44 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are t statistics. Variables were taken from the World Bank Development   
Indicators. Note that the significance level is: *p<0.05; **p<0.01 
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Appendix B: 
 
Variables Explanation                        Source 
Per-Capita Income Gross Domestic Product Per-capita Growth   World Bank  
Resource rents per labor  Resource Rents per unit of labor force  World Bank  
Savings 
FDI  
Total Savings as a percentage of GDP 
Total FDA as a percentage of GDP  
 World Bank 
 World Bank 
Education Spending Government Expenditures on Education Per Capita  World Bank  
Trade Terms of Trade As a percentage of GDP  World Bank  
Manu-Per-GDP  Manufacturing Products as a Percentage of GDP  World Bank  
Government Transfers  Government transfers and subsidies of total expenses  World Bank  
Democracy  Democracy level going from 0(Nondemocratic) to 6 (Democratic)  ICRG 
Technological output index  Innovation and production of high tech products  Global Innovation Index  
Corruption.  
 Corruption level going from 0(corrupt) to 5 (not corrupt) ICRG  
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